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COMPUTING  EQUILIBRIA  OF  N-PERSON  GAMES* 
ROBERT  WILSONt 
Abstract.  The algorithm  of  Lemke  and Howson for  finding  an equilibrium  of  a 2-person  game 
is extended  to provide  a constructive  procedure  for  finding  an equilibrium  of  an N-person  game  by 
finding  in succession  an equilibrium  for  each of  certain  related  k-person  games,  1 < k _ N. 
1. Introduction.  The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate  that the 
algorithm  of  C. E. Lemke  and J.  T. Howson [1], originally  formulated  as a con- 
structive  procedure  for  finding  an equilibrium  of  a 2-person  game,  can,  in fact, 
be extended  directly  to  construct  an equilibrium  of  an N-person  game.  Of  course, 
the  procedure  requires  the  solution  of  multilinear  equations  in the  general  case, 
rather  than simply  linear  equations as in the 2-person  case, but presumably 
there  are or will  be numerical  methods  adequate to this  task.  Nash [3] gives  an 
example  of  a 3-person  game with  rational  data and an irrational  equilibrium. 
The central  idea is that,  in general,  an almost-complementary  path leads 
to an equilibrium,  just as in the  2-person  case. Moreover,  one can find  a point 
on an almost-complementary  path with  which  to initiate  the procedure  by 
constructing  an equilibrium  of  an (N -  1)-person  game.  Hence,  one  can  construct 
an equilibrium  of  an N-person  game  by  constructing  in succession  equilibria  of 
certain  k-person  games,  1 ? k ? N -  1. 
2. Formulation.  We consider an N-person noncooperative  game FN  in 
normal  form  (cf.  Nash  [3]  or  Luce  and  Raiffa  [2,  pp.  170-173]).  Let  P = {  1,  *.* , N} 
be the  finite  set  of  players,  and for  n  E P let  Sn  be the  finite  set  of  pure  strategies 
available to player  n in the  normal-form  description.  Then 7 = 
XneP  Sn  is the 
set  of  possible  plays  of  the  game.  For each n  E P and co  E  i  we are given  u,  , the 
utility  to player  n from  the  play w. We assume  without  loss of  generality  that 
(neP)(wrc-  )un  <  0, and let an =-u%  >  O.'  Define the array An  = (an  ).C 
with  N attributes  and positive  elements  (An  >  0). 
A  mixed  strategy  for a  player n  E P  is a  probability  distribution,  say 
n=  (4)i,  over  his  pure  strategies  in  Sn; that  is,  (i  E  Sn)  >  >  0 and  >jS  =  1. 
Thus,  Xn  is an element  of  the  face  of  the  ISnI-dimensional  unit  simplex  an, and 
Q  is the probability  with  which  player  n uses his ith pure strategy.  Define 
=  XneP cn, the  collection  of  mixed  strategy  combinations  for  the  game.  Also, 
for  each player v  E P  and  E  .  let -v(4) =  {  E , (n  :  V)n  =  Xn}  ,  the sub- 
collection  with  player  v's  mixed  strategy  variable.  In general,  for  any  x  E  E', the 
Euclidean  space of  K = EneP I  Snl  dimensions,  where  x =  ((x0)1AC )nep,  let 
A(X)  E  a"  n  XJ  i  is Sn, n  c P; 
X 
v  =  ifl 
An(x)  =  E  AX(x)xn,  ne P. 
ieSn 
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In particular,  a mixed  strategy  combination  4 E_  yields  an expected  utility  of 
-IA()  to player  n conditionally  on his pure  strategy  i,  and an unconditional 
expected  utility  of -An(). 
An equilibrium  is a mixed  strategy  combination  4 e  E  for  which 
(n  c-  P)  (4  c-  An)) An(:  <-A"(: 
so that  no player  wishes  to  change  his  mixed  strategy  alone.  Since  I' could  assign 
probability  one to any one of n's pure  strategies,  it is readily  verified  that  an 
equivalent definition  is that (n  e P) (i -  S)  AX()  > An(4). Moreover,  one can 
eliminate  the  restriction  c  E  by  transforming  variables  as follows:  Define  L  H  Av(4)  '(N  -  ) 
(2)  tX~~~~~n  LAn(4)N  - 2 
(2)=j 
n  X  =  1(n  (:,  n  EP; 
then,  for  an equilibrium  it  is necessary  and sufficient  to find  x,  y  E En  for  which 
(3)  (n  c-P) (i  SJ  xin >  O,  yin  >  O,  Xi(x) -yin  =  1,  xinyi  =  O. 
The explicit  derivation  of  (3) parallels  the  exposition  of  Lemke  and Howson for 
the  2-person  case. Ordinarily,  if  we are given  x  E E" we assume  y to be defined 
implicitly  by yi =  AX(x)  -  1. 
From  a solution  (x,  y)  to  (3) one obtains  an equilibrium  4 E 2.  via  the  reverse 
transformation  (n  e P) 4n =  (ZieX)-  lXn.  Consequently,  the problem  of con- 
structing  a solution  to (3) is the  immediate  subject  of  our  investigation. 
3. Geometric  characterization.  For each player  n  E P let 
n  =  {x xc E',x _ 0,(i eSO)A  X(x)>  1} 
and let  Z* =  nneP  Xn. Clearly  each Xn is closed and nonempty,  since  An  >  0, 
and each Xn  and Z* contain  every  solution  to (3). Nash [3] has given  a fixed- 
point  proof  of  the  existence  of  an equilibrium,  so Z* is nonempty,  although  later 
we shall  provide  a constructive  proof  of  this  fact. 
It will  suffice  here  to consider  a pertinent  subset  of  Z*, namely,  the  set  Z 
of  points  from  Z* for  which  xi  (A7(x)  -  1) >  0 for  at most  one  pair  (n,  i), n  E P, 
i  E Sn  . Such  a point  is  said  to  be almost  complementary,  or  (n,  i)-almost-complemen- 
tary,  and if  x is (n,  i)-almost-complementary  but  xi(AX(x)  -  1) = 0 then  x is said 
to be complementary.  Clearly,  Z contains  all solutions  to (3), and a point  x  E E' 
solves  (3) if  and only  if  x is  a complementary  point  in  Z. 
A point  in E'  is a vector  of  dimension  K =  >neP  ISnl  . On the  other  hand, 
a point  in Z c E'  is almost  complementary,  which  requires  that  it satisfy  at 
least K  -  1  equalities  of the form xi =  0 or AX(x)  =  1, called  the boundary 
conditions  of  Z*. Hence,  one expects  that  ordinarily  Z will  be a graph  of  dimen- 82  ROBERT  WILSON 
sionality  K -  (K -  1) =  1.  But  to  ensure  this  we  impose  the  following  restriction 
throughout.2'3 
Nondegeneracy  assumption:  No  point in the nonnegative  orthant  of E' 
satisfies  more  than  K boundary  conditions,  and no two  points  in  the  nonnegative 
orthant  of  En  satisfy  the  same K boundary  conditions. 
With  this  convention,  Z is  a unidimensional  graph  in  E" and  it  is  worthwhile 
to distinguish  its  nodes  and arcs. 
A node  of  Z is a point  in  Z that  is  an extreme  point  of  Z*; that  is,  it  satisfies 
(precisely)  K  boundary  conditions.  Clearly,  there  is only a finite  number  of 
nodes  of  Z, and a point  x  E E" solves  (3)  if  and only  if  it  is  a complementary  node 
in  Z. 
Similarly,  an arc  of  Z, corresponding  to  an open  edge  of  Z*, is  the  collection 
of  points  in Z satisfying  some  specified  set  of  (precisely)  K -  1 boundary  condi- 
tions  as one varies  parametrically  some  value  xn  or  yn  in the  open  interval  from 
zero,  at an extreme  point  of  Z*, to  the  first  value  at  which  another  extreme  point 
(if  any)  is encountered.  Clearly,  an arc "leaves" Z* only  at an extreme  point  of 
Z*;  that  is,  at a node of  Z. Note that  for  N >  3 an arc is nonlinear;  actually, 
multilinear. 
The  idea of  a constructive  procedure,  due originally  to Lemke  and Howson, 
is  to  proceed  from  one  almost-complementary  node  to  another,  along  the  almost- 
complementary  arcs,  until  a complementary  node  is found,  which  must  solve  (3) 
and yield  an equilibrium. 
4. Almost-complementary  paths.  For some fixed  player  m  E P and a pure 
strategy  choice  j e Sm, let Z(m,  j) be the subset  of (m,  j)-almost-complementary 
points  in Z. Clearly,  for  each pair  (m,  j), x solves  (3) if  and only  if  x is a comple- 
mentary  node in Z(m,  j), so the  choice  of  (m,  j) may  be arbitrary. 
LEMMA  1. A node  in  Z(m,  j) has  either  one  or  two  (m,  j)-almost-complementary 
arcs  starting  from  it,  and  there  is  just  one  if  and  only  if  the  node  is  complementary. 
Proof.  A node x  E Z(m,  j) satisfies  precisely  K boundary  conditions  and is 
either  complementary  or almost  complementary.  If x is complementary,  then 
precisely  one of  each  pair  (xn,  y  ) is  zero,  and only  that  arc  starting  from  x that  is 
parametrized  by  the  one of  xJ or  ym  that  is zero  is (m,j)-almost-complementary. 
Otherwise,  x is not complementary  but almost  complementary  with  both xm 
and  yJ positive,  and there  is  a unique  pair  (n,  i)  for  which  both  x' and  yn  are  zero. 
In this  case,  only  the  two  arcs  starting  from  x that  are parametrized  by  x' and 
y' respectively  are (m,  j)-almost-complementary,  and these are distinct.  This 
concludes  the  proof 
Similar  arguments  show  that  a complementary  node in Z has precisely  K 
arcs starting  from  it,  whereas  a node that  is not complementary  has precisely 
two  and belongs  to  just one Z(m,  j). A maximal  connected  set  of  (m,  j)-almost- 
complementary  nodes  and  arcs  is  called  an (m,  j)-path.  Clearly,  Z(m,  j) is  the  union 
of  a finite  number  of  (m,  j)-paths. 
2 Lemke  and Howson [1] give  a procedure  for  perturbing  a degenerate  problem  to satisfy  this 
assumption,  but  we  shall  not  consider  such  extensions  here. 
3 This is sufficient  to ensure  the nondegeneracy  of all of the derived  games  7k, 1 < k  <  N, 
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Let FN-1(m,j)  be the  (N - 1)-person game among the  other  players  that 
results  from  assuming  that  player  m uses his strategy  j  with  probability  one 
(i.e.,  X7  =  1,  (i  E  Sm,  i 7A  j  i = 0) 
LEMMA  2. An equilibrium  of  FN-  I(M, j) corresponds  to  an (m,  j)-almost-com- 
plementary  node  in  Z(m,  j). 
Proof.  Let  (,n),  -  m  be  an equilibrium  of  FN -  1(m,  j)  .  We  distinguish  two  cases: 
either  N ?  3 or N = 2. If N ?  3, then  let the  transformation  (2) of  (4n)n  m  in 
the  (N -  1)-person  game FN-1(m,j)  be (f-n)  m' so that  (-n)  m  satisfies  (3) for 
FNm-  (m, j).  This can  be converted  to the N-person game FN  by defining 
(i  e Sm)[5m  =  1  if  i = j, and  m-  =  0 if  i  1  j]. Then x = (5n)ncP  satisfies  (3) for  FN 
except  possibly  for  n = m. Define  ,B-minies,m  Am(5)  and let i*  E Sm  yield  the 
minimum.  Then  define 
(neP,n  :#  m)xn  =  #-11(N-1)xn 
xm  -  /3(N-2  )/(N-1)  5m 
Letting  x =  (Xn)nep  one obtains 
(n  E  P, n =A  m)(i  E S) An(x)  =  An(5))xm[fl-  1/(N-  1)]N-2  =  n(X) 
(i E Sm) Am(x)  = Am(5/)  1/(N- 1)]N-1 
A  Am(x-)/, 
=  Am(x)/Aim*()  >  1  (with  =  1  if  i = i*). 
Hence,  x satisfies  (3) excepting  only  the  possibility  that  xmyY  > 0, SO  x is (m,  j)- 
almost-complementary,  x  e Z(m,  j), and also x is a node. The proof  if  N -  2, 
which  is implicit  in Lemke and Howson's exposition,  is rather  different.  For 
n = m  the  fact  that  Xn is an equilibrium  requires  (i  E SO)[  i  =  1 if  i-C  w*  and 
=  0 if  i =#  wfl, where  co*  El  yields  min,m=j  a.  Let o-)**  yield  min,,,,,=,,*  a,, 
and define 
(i  E Sm)[x7  =  1/an*  if  i =j,  and  xT =0  if  i =  j], 
(iES)[xn  =  1/am.  if  i =o*,  and  x7 = O  if  i =A  #o]. 
Let  x =  ((Xn)ieS,)nep.  Then  one finds: 
(i E Sm)  AT(x) =  am,(*)x(n  =  am(,)*)Iam**  >  1  (with =  1 if  i =  (**), 
(i  E Sn)A  (x) = an,  i)X = an,i)/an*  >  1  (with  =  1  if  i = w). 
Hence,  as before,  x is (m,  j)-almost-complementary,  x  E Z(m,  j), and x is a node. 
This  concludes  the  proof  of  the  lemma. 
A node of  Z(m,  j) that  arises  from  an equilibrium  of  FN  - 1(m,  j) is called an 
initial  node  of  Z(m,  j) and is identified  by  the  feature  that  xm  is positive  only  for 
i = j. The initial  nodes are the  endpoints  of  the  unbounded  arcs of  Z(m,  j), as 
we shall  now  establish. 
LEMMA  3. An arc in Z(m,j) that  starts  from  any node  other  than  an initial 
node  is  bounded,  and  an initial  node  is  the  endpoint  of  precisely  one  unbounded  arc. 
Proof.  The  proof  of  Lemma  3  is  broken  up  into  several  simpler  propositions. 84  ROBERT WILSON 
Let x* be a node  in  Z(m,  j) which  is not  an initial  node  of  Z(m,  j), and let  T 
be an arc of  Z(m,  j) that  starts  from  x*. 
PROPOSITION  1.  For each  ne  P there  exists  i(n)e  Sn  for  which  (xe T)An(n)(X)  =  1 
ProoJ.  Suppose  to  the  contrary  that  (since  T is an arc)  for  some  n  E P, x  E T, 
(i  E Sn)AX(x)  >  1.  Then  for  x to  be  (m,  j)-almost-complementary  requires  that  either 
(a) x  =  0 if  n =A  m,  or  (b) (i  e Sm,i  =  7j)x'  = 0 if  n = m.  In case (a), for  any  v  e P, 
v :A  n,  i  E Sv,  one has Av(x)  = 0 <  1,  contradicting  x  E Z(m,  j) c  Xv. In case (b), 
the  same  property  must  hold  for  x*,  contradicting  the  assumption  that  x* is not 
an initial  node of  Z(m,  j). 
PROPOSITION  2. If for some n  e P, i  e  Sn,  x7  is unbounded  along T, then 
(i  E  Sv)x -  0  along  T  for  some  v  E  P. 
Proof.  Define A.v(x) in the obvious way so that An(x)  =  j,Js' A"7(x)x, 
and similarly  define  A  nvj,v2(x),  etc.  Suppose,  say,  that  x1 is unbounded  along T 
but,  contrary  to the  proposition,  for  each v  E P there  is some  j(v)  E Sv  for  which 
it  is false  that  Xv(v) -+0 along T. By  letting  i(2) =  1  for  definiteness,  the  condition 
along T  that 1 =  A2(x) =  ZieS  A21(x)xl  requires  that A21(x) -+ 0 along T. 
If  there  were  only  two players,  then  A21(x) = a21, a contradiction,  so there  is 
a third  player  for  which  A21(x) = Ejcs, A  21Nx)x]  X  0 along T. If  j(3) =  1,  then 
this  requires  A  21(x)  -+ 0 along T. Hence there  is a fourth  player,  etc.,  and one 
can repeat  the  process  until  the  set  of  players  is exhausted  and one has found  a 
contradiction. 
PROPOSITION  3. If T  is unbounded,  then  there  are at least three  players 
(i.e.,  N  _  3), and  xv  -+ 0 along  Tfor at least  two  players  v  E P. 
Proof.  The  proof  of  Proposition  2  actually  shows  that  if  some  x7  is  unbounded 
along T,  then  for  each n :A  n,  the  condition  An(n)(x)  =  1 implies  the  existence  of 
a v  E P, v =A  n-,  v =A  n,  for  which  xv  -+ 0. Hence,  there  are at least  three  players. 
Moreover,  by choosing  n = v and repeating  the  construction  one must  obtain 
a second  player  v'  for  which  xv'  -+ 0. 
PROPOSITION 4. T is bounded. 
Proof.  For each x  E E', a)  E 7, and n  E P, define  hn(x,  co)  =  Hxv, where  the 
product  is  over  those  (v,  j) for  which  wov  = j and  v =A  n.  Thus,  AX(x)  = E anh  ,(x,  w), 
where  the  sum  is over  those  w  E it for  which  wn  = i.  According  to Proposition  1, 
(n  e P)(x e T)Ani(n)(x)  =  1. Consequently,  there  exists  a positive  constant  b such 
that  (n  E P)(wo  E 7t)(x  e T)hn(x,  w))  <  b,  and for  each n  E P there  exists  an co(n)  E 7t 
for  which  it  is false  that  hn(x,  w(n))  -+ 0 along T. Now, suppose,  contrary  to the 
proposition,  that  say x1 is unbounded  along T. Choose that  &e3  e it for  which 
=  1 and (n  E  P,  n  :A  1) &cn  =  w-)n(l);  clearly,  (x  E T)h1(x,  co)  = h1(x,  co(1))  and 
therefore  it  is false  that  h1(x,  co)  -+ 0 along T.  Define  Hn(x,  ow)  = H  hv(x,  co),  where 
the product  is over v  E P, v =A  n. Clearly,  Hn(x,  w) <  bN-1 along T. Observe, 
however,  that H1(x,  &i)  = (xl)Nlh1  (x, &4N-2*  Hence, since x1 is unbounded 
along T by supposition,  and Proposition  3 assures that  N >  3, hl(x,  co)  -+ 0 
along T.  This  is a contradiction,  and the  proof  that  T is  bounded  is  complete. 
The same reasoning  shows  that  if  x* is an initial  node of  Z(m,j), but  x* is 
not complementary  and x*m  = AT(x*)  -  1 = 0 for  some i  E Sm,  i :A  j, then  the 
(m,j)-almost-complementary  arc T that  is parametrized  by  x' must  be bounded, 
since  Proposition  1 is again valid with  i(m)  = i. Finally,  whether  or not x* is 
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arc  parametrized  by  y7  (i = j if  x* is complementary)  is unbounded.  This  com- 
pletes  the  proof  of  Lemma  3. 
THEOREM 1. The number  of  equilibria  is  positive  and  odd. 
Proof.  The proof  is by induction  on the number  of players.  Clearly,  a 
(nondegenerate)  1-person  game  has a single  equilibrium.  Assume  therefore  that 
a (nondegenerate)  (N -  1)-person  game  has an odd number  of  equilibria.  Then 
FN-1(mJ)  has an odd number  of  equilibria,  and therefore  Z(m,j) has an odd 
number  of  initial  nodes.  Now starting  from  an arbitrary  node x in Z(m,  j) there 
are  either  one or  two  (m,  j)-almost-complementary  arcs,  and  just  one whenever  x 
is complementary.  Also one such  arc is unbounded  if  and only  if  x is an initial 
node.  Traversing  a bounded  arc,  one arrives  at another  node,  say  xl. Now,  if  xi 
is complementary,  then  there  is no exit  from  xl on a new  (m,j)-almost-comple- 
mentary  arc; if  x1 is an initial  node,  then  the  only  exit  is along an unbounded 
arc; and,  otherwise,  there  is precisely  one such  exit  along  another  bounded  arc. 
Each (m,  j)-almost-complementary  arc  starting  from  x proceeds  therefore  through 
a finite  number  of  nodes  of  Z(m,  j) until  it  terminates  in  either  a complementary 
node,  or an unbounded  arc,  or  returns  to x (to return  to  any  other  node,  say  xl, 
would imply  the existence  of three  (m,  j)-almost-complementary  arcs starting 
from  x1). In the  latter  case,  x is on an (m,  j)-path  that  is circular  and contains  no 
complementary  nodes.  The two  former  cases resolve  into  whether  the  (m,  j)-path 
containing  x has 0, 1,  or 2 initial  nodes. If  there  are no initial  nodes,  then  the 
terminus  at each of  the  two  ends  must  be a complementary  node.  If  there  is one 
initial  node  and therefore  one unbounded  arc,  then  the  other  terminus  must  be a 
complementary  node.  If  there  are two  initial  nodes,  then  the  path  terminates  in 
an unbounded  arc at both  ends,  and consequently  there  is no complementary 
node. Now, the  induction  hypothesis  assures  that  there  are an odd number  of 
initial  nodes; hence,  there  are  an odd number  of  complementary  nodes  and thus 
an odd number  of  equilibria.  This  completes  the  proof. 
A complementary  node that  is on an (m,  j)-path  with  just one initial  node 
will  be said to be (m,  j)-accessible,  and any  other  is one of  an (m,  j)-inaccessible 
pair.  Clearly,  the  number  of  (m,  j)-accessible  complementary  nodes  is odd. 
5. A constructive  procedure.  The foregoing  results  suggest  a procedure  for 
constructing  an equilibrium  of  an N-person  game; namely,  by  finding  an (m,  jm)- 
accessible  complementary  node  of  Z(m,  jm)  for  an arbitrary  player  m  E P and  some 
one of  his  pure  strategies  jm  E Sm. 
Let m  = N and suppose  that  one has specified  (n,  jn) for  each n  E P, n :  1. 
Then one has a 1-person  game F1({(n,  Jn)Jn  >  1}) played  by the  first  player  for 
which  one  can readily  find  the  unique  equilibrium.  This  equilibrium  provides  the 
unique  initial  node  in  Z(2,  j2) for  the  2-person  game  F2({(n,  1n)In  >  2}) from  which 
one can proceed  along the  (2,  j2)-path  containing  it to find  the unique (2,j2)- 
accessible  complementary  node  (as described  previously  by  Lemke  and Howson 
[1]). In turn,  this  node provides  an initial  node  in Z(3,  J3)  for  the  3-person  game 
F3({(n,  Jn)Jn  >  3}). Continuing  in this  fashion,  one wants  in general  to find  a 
complementary  node in Z(k-1,  k-l1)  for  the  game  Fk-l({(n,  jn)ln  >  k  -  1}) to 
provide  an initial  node in Z(k,jk)  for  the  k-person  game  Fk({(nJn)Jln  >  k}) from 
which  to proceed  along the  (k,jk)-path  containing  it in order  to find  a (k,jk)- 86  ROBERT WILSON 
accessible  complementary  node. When this  procedure  has been completed  for 
k = N one has found  an (N,JN)-accessible  complementary  node for  the  original 
problem  and therefore  an equilibrium.  For k  >  3, however,  the procedure  is 
unlike  Lemke  and Howson's  algorithm  in  that  not  every  initial  node  need  be on a 
(k,jk)-path  containing  a complementary  node,  and it  is the  circumvention  of  this 
difficulty  that  we must  explain  below. 
In order  to illustrate  the  basic idea most  simply,  suppose  for  the  moment 
that  the  (k  -  1)-person  game  has only  one  (k  -1,  1k  1)-accessible  complementary 
node,  all others  being  grouped  into  inaccessible  pairs; e.g.,  this  is the  case for 
k  -  1 = 2 since  there  is only  one initial  node.  Of  course  it  is precisely  this  com- 
plementary  node  that  will  be found  by  the  procedure  when  one  is ready  to begin 
working  on the  k-person  game.  Now,  since  one has found  the  accessible  comple- 
mentary  node in the (k  - 1)-person game,  it provides  an initial  node for  the 
k-person  game.  This initial  node,  say x, is either  complementary  (in which  case 
one is finished  if  k = N or else one moves  on to the  (k +  1)-person  game) or 
there  is  a unique  bounded  (k,  jk)-almost-complementary  arc  along  which  one  can 
move to traverse  the  (k,  jk)-path  containing  x. This path terminates  in either  a 
complementary  node (in which  case again one moves  on to the  (k +  1)-person 
game) or another  initial  node. In the  latter  case, observe  that  this  initial  node 
must  arise  from  a complementary  node of  the  (k  -  1)-person  game  which  is one 
member  of  a (k  -1,  Ik- 1)-inaccessible  pair.  Hence,  from  this  member  there  is a 
unique (k  - 1,k  -1)-almost-complementary arc which  one can traverse  in the 
(k  -  1)-person  game which  leads to the  other  member  of  the  pair.  This second 
member  provides  a new  initial  node  for  the  k-person  game,  on a new  (k,jk)-path, 
from  which  one  can begin  again.  Continuing  in  this  way,  one  must  find  an initial 
node  that  leads  to a (k,  jk)-accessible  complementary  node  for  the  k-person  game. 
To see  this,  recall  that  the  number  of  initial  nodes  is odd and at least  one  is on a 
path containing  a complementary  node; also, one cannot  return  to an initial 
node  previously  encountered  since  that  would  imply,  if  it  were  x,  that  the  equilib- 
rium  from  which  x arises  is (k -  LIk- 1)-inaccessible,  or  if  it  were  any  other,  that 
there are three (k  -  1,Ik-,1)-inaccessible complementary  nodes on  a  single 
(k -1,  Ik- 1)-path  in the  (k  -  1)-person  game. 
The  procedure  in  the  general  case  is  merely  a variant  of  the  above.  In  general, 
one must  allow for  the  possibility  that  in the  course  of  the  above procedure  one 
finds  a new initial  node in the  k-person  game that  arises  from  a (k  -  1,jk-  _)- 
accessible complementary  node in the (k  -  1)-person  game,  rather  than one 
member  of  an inaccessible  pair.  In this  case,  one  proceeds  along  the  (k  -  1,jk-  )- 
path  containing  the  accessible  complementary  node in the  (k  -  1)-person  game 
to  reach  its  initial  node,  which  arises  from  a complementary  node  in  the  (k  -  2)- 
person game. If this complementary  node is (k  -  2,jk- 2)-accessible  in the 
(k  -  2)-person  game,  then  one repeats.  After  not  more  than  k  -  2 iterations  one 
must  reach  a complementary  node  in  a (k  -  v)-person  game  which  is  (k  -v,  Ik- v- 
inaccessible  and  therefore  is  one  member  of  an  inaccessible  pair,  the  other  member 
of  which  provides  a new  initial  node  of  the  (k  -  v  +  1)-person  game  from  which 
one can again  continue.  As before,  this  procedure  cannot  cycle. 
THEOREM  2. One has a  constructive  procedure  for  finding  an equilibrium 
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The  term  "constructive"  as employed  here  presumes,  of  course,  that  one 
has  a means  of  finding  the  node  at  the  endpoint  of  any  bounded  arc  traversed 
in  the  course  of  the  procedure.  Since  for  N _ 3 this  requires  the  solution  of  a 
set  of  simultaneous  multilinear  equations,  at least  with  a sufficient  degree  of 
numerical  accuracy,  this  is  by  no  means  a trivial  presumption. 
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